Given the complexities of our national government and the current international environment, the role of the Unified Command has changed dramatically. Increasingly, the U.S. military is being pulled into Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). As a result the Combatant Commander is finding that synchronization among the national instruments of power within the AOR has become as important as synchronization on the battlefield. One area that the United States appears to be struggling with is how to counter adversarial propaganda effectively. Planning for and implementation of Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) may offer the Combatant Commander an opportunity to more effectively shape his theater environment. This paper will briefly examine how propaganda might be delivered to a target audience in order to illustrate why the geographic Combatant Commander needs to develop options other than psychological operations to counter adversarial propaganda.
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. This paper will briefly examine how propaganda might be delivered to a target audience in order to illustrate why the geographic Combatant Commander needs to develop options other than psychological operations to counter adversarial propaganda.
The geographic Combatant Commander's theater strategy planning will then be analyzed and recommendations developed for FDOs which address the threat posed by anti-U.S.
propaganda campaigns. 1 
Introduction
Given the complexities of our national government and the current international environment, the role of the Combatant Commander has changed dramatically.
Increasingly, the United States (U.S.) military is being pulled into Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW). As a result the geographic Combatant Commander is finding that synchronization among the national instruments of power within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) has become as important as synchronization on the battlefield.
The theater security environment has also changed dramatically because of globalization and the end of the Cold War. State and non-state actors are connected in unprecedented ways: the lightening speed of information transfer around the world (e.g. CNN, Internet); dependence on common international critical information infrastructures (e.g. commercial satellites, fiber optic cable routes); economic interdependencies (e.g. multi-national corporations, trade agreements, financial networks); and the international impact of environmental and demographic issues (e.g. global warming, AIDs, water).
Technological advancements and concurrent societal changes, however, will not be available to all resulting in organized crime, terrorists, and failing/rogue nations remaining the "wildcard" in the security equation. The National Security Strategy (NSS)
states that: "The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world's most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur." 2 In addressing how an adversary might fight, one cannot ignore the power of adversarial propaganda and the need to counter its effect within a geographic Combatant Commander's AOR. To do so requires a profound understanding of the adversary's beliefs, message, and delivery mechanism. As noted in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations:
"Regional challenges will often involve an adversary whose system of beliefs is fundamentally different to include core beliefs such as right and wrong, the value of human life, and the concept of victory and defeat. What appears to be irrational or fanatical to US forces may be completely rational to multinational partners or opponents." 3 The geographic Combatant Commander must be able to recognize and effectively counter the threat posed by these divergent factors and the application of adversarial anti-U.S.
propaganda within the AOR and international community.
Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) provide the geographic Combatant
Commander an opportunity to shape his theater environment using the full range of U.S. national tools of power in concert with a theater engagement strategy. These include diplomatic, information, military and economic activities. There are limitations to their use under the current planning and execution processes and these limitations will be discussed later. However, concerted efforts to plan for and develop FDOs to counter adversarial propaganda are critical to reducing the threat to U.S. forces, enhancing U.S. credibility, and establishing and sustaining the support of host nations and the international community. This paper will briefly examine how propaganda might be delivered to a target audience in order to illustrate why the geographic Combatant Commander needs to develop options other than psychological operations to counter adversarial propaganda.
propaganda campaigns.
Propaganda Unleashed
There is a tendency when discussing propaganda to focus in on the psychological operations waged during war. Images of leaflets dropping, music blaring outside compounds, food packets falling from the sky, and manipulation of television, video, and sound bites immediately come to mind. This is not the type of propaganda to be addressed here.
Rather, it is to look within an AOR and determine the sources of and reasons for anti-U.S. sentiments and to determine which can be addressed by an application of FDOs.
To be effective, propaganda is usually presented to the populace through apparently neutral channels which include, but are not limited to, government agencies, scientific research, news, education venues, and/or entertainment mediums. It is designed "to win over the public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive [in the mind of the receiver] conclusions packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons." 4 It may also be used to sell an ideology or image which supports an action or policy. 5 The Hizbollah movement illustrates an effective propaganda campaign which involves the orchestration of a number of propaganda channels. In the 1990s, Hizbollah grew as a "military" force as well as a benefactor to Lebanon's population by providing extensive social, educational, health and welfare services which were not being provided by the state. These ran the gamut from providing free heath care through a network of hospitals, infirmaries, pharmacies and dental clinics; rebuilding structures damaged by Israeli attacks; building homes and shelters; constructing water systems; to providing loans for marriages, schools and small business ventures. These actions established Hizbollah as more than a terrorist group, at least in the eyes of the Lebanon populace. 6 This popular base allowed Hizbollah to eventually establish itself as a political entity and win seats in the Lebanese parliament. How successful was the campaign? Three years later, in an interview with Qatarbased al-Jazeera television, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice actually had to explain the reasons for continuing sanctions on Iraq, at last challenging the Iraqi propaganda that Saddam's regime, not U.S. sanctions, were responsible for the continuing distress of Iraq's people." 9 Two years later, the U.S. Central Command was again fully engaged in Iraq and dealing with the effects of Saddam's propaganda campaigns on his populace, the Arab world, and the international community at large.
Planning Considerations
Despite assertions to the contrary, military planning is not done in isolation. Amnesty International) and PVOs (e.g. Doctors without Borders). In the 1990s, and continuing today, international and intra-state strife has spawned conflicts which compelled international intervention. In the case of a humanitarian relief effort, the U.N.
High Commission for Refugees and other IGOs and NGOs might rely on logistical support from U.S. military units, or in the case of a U.N. peace operation, the U.S.
military and civilian agencies might join forces to provide long-term support to the operation. 21 Regardless, the nature of these activities and the complexity of the command and control structure, where no one entity is "in charge" of all, places a strain on the U.S. military units which are tasked to engage --
The stage on which these organizations and forces must operate is typically crowded, not only with warring factions and hard-pressed local populations but also with a multi-faceted cast of foreign entities -other militaries, IGOS, and NGOs; diplomats and aid workers from national governments; private individuals and foundations -that are likewise working to alleviate suffering and restore peace. Despite their broadly similar objectives, however, cooperation between these third parties is by no means inevitable. There are numerous activities that such cooperation can facilitate: policing, security, refugee resettlement, physical reconstruction, transportation, the provision of food, shelter, and health services, and so on. Yet, establishing cooperative relations among the various external players is one of the most challenging aspects of the international response to conflict and disaster. 22 In order to be effective in these situations and minimize the potential for hostility towards U.S. military presence, the geographic Combatant Commanders' planning staffs must understand the authorities, roles, and capabilities of the other players and develop coordination and communication methods with them. 23 It is important that they know which NGOs and PVOs operating within their AOR are involved in which activities, including education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. 24 These might form a basis or link for the development of FDOs which counter adversarial propaganda.
History has shown us that the complexion of these activities can change rapidly:
"In situations where religious, socioeconomic, or political divisions are longstanding, animosities often run very deep and violence can erupt at a moment's notice. Belligerent parties may not only attack each other but also target outsiders, be they civilians or soldiers…A show of strength can help defuse tense situations…though it can also tempt extremists on one or both sides to test the resolve of the intervening force or to create conditions that discredit the force's presence." 
Recommendations
The construction of FDOs to counter anti-U.S.
propaganda is a practice of operational art. Each geographic Combatant Commander will be dealing with unique, and potentially volatile, situations within their AOR caused by anti-U.S. propaganda. To deal with these situations, the geographic Combatant Commanders' planning staffs will need to identify the conditions which must be produced to counter the propaganda; the sequence of events likely to produce the desired results; the resources required; and, the likely costs and risks involved. There are those who would argue that the role of the U.S. military is to be a fighting force. This is true. However, as long as it is U.S. national policy to have a forward presence, the reality is that the forces in theater become the codification of U.S.
plans and intentions to a foreign audience. The geographic Combatant Commander is no longer the solution for when diplomacy fails, he is now part of the answer for why diplomacy succeeds. The importance of this role is recognized in Joint publications dealing with a wide range of topics (e.g. multinational, peace and interagency operations).
It must now be recognized in practice.
Conclusion
"Prudent use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and disaster relief, nation assistance (to include security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and foreign consequence management (CM)), counterdrug operations, arms control, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping. Such operations are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces or units deployed from another theater or the continental United States (CONUS) or a combination of both." 36 The world continues to change dramatically. As the common threat of the USSR disappeared, the perceived need for U.S. protection by Allies and neutrals diminished causing alliances to loosen and coalitions to fragment. Using FDOs to counter anti-U.S. propaganda ties to all three of these. Impediments exist, however, to using the FDO process to achieve them.
They include the disparity between geographic Combatant Commands' TEPs:
"For example, USEUCOM's TEP is highly detailed and is based on regional, subregional, and country objectives that are associated with approximately 5000 annual activities. By contrast, USCENTCOM's TEP is based on 15 strategic theater objectives, five of which relate to engagement; 
